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ATToRNEYs' FEES-PUBLIC INTEREST LAW-BEYOND Alyeska: CREATING A WORKABLE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION-

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).

Following a successful appeal in litigation undertaken in the public
interest, 1 plaintiffs Wilderness Society and others2 requested an award
of attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit3 adopted the "private attorney general" exception to the
American rule which bars fee shifting and authorized an award
against codefendant Alyeska Pipeline Service Company of one-half 4
of the reasonable value of the legal services utilized by plaintiffs. 5 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. Held: Absent congressional
authorization, federal courts lack the equity power to award attorneys'
fees to a private litigant for the vindication of a statutory right.
1. The federal district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Secretary of the Interior from issuing right-of-way permits to Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company (owned by seven major oil companies) in violation of § 28 of the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325
F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). After the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, an expedited appeal resulted in reversal and a permanent injunction was issued. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). This reversal was based on § 28 of the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Issues involving the environmental impact statement required under § 4321 of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), were not resolved. 479 F.2d at 887-88.
In response, Congress enacted legislation remoying the statutory obstacles and authorizing construction of the pipeline. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1651-55 (Supp. V 1975). For a detailed presentation of the pipeline controversy
see Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 337 (1973).
2. The Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and Friends of the Earth were original
coplaintiffs with the Wilderness Society. The Cordova District Fisheries Union was
also an appellant before the court of appeals. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane).
3. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), noted
in 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 258 (1974); 51 N.D.L. REV. 530 (1974); 36 OHIO ST. LJ.
201 (1974).
4. Because 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) (immunity of the United States from costs
and fees, based on the common law concept of sovereign immunity) prohibits the
award of fees against the government, the authorized award of attorneys' fees was
reduced to one-half their actual value. 495 F.2d at 1036. Further, the court deemed it
inappropriate to assess fees against the State of Alaska, a voluntary intervenor in the
suit, as such action would "undermine rather than further the goal of ensuring adequate spokesmen for public interests." Id. n.8.
5. The court of appeals awarded statutory costs, but remanded to the district court
the factual issue of the reasonable value of counsel services rendered. 495 F.2d at
1036-37.
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Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240

(1975).
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The American Rule and Its Exceptions

The general rule in the United States proscribes the inclusion of
attorneys' fees as an element of the damages or costs assessed against
the losing party. 6 Statutory exceptions to the rule, however, provide
for both mandatory 7 and discretionary8 fee awards. Judicially authorized fee shifting, justified by federal equity power,9 may take place in
reliance upon either the "bad faith"'10 or the "common benefit"" ex6. As stated by Chief Justice Warren in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967): "The rule here has long been that attorney's
fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract
providing therefor." In defense of the rule it has been said that it encourages resort to
the courts by eliminating a possible financial risk of litigation, protecting the losing
party from undue burdens, and relieving the courts of the task of administering fee
awards. Id. at 718. For detailed analyses of the development of the rule see Falcon.
Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD. L.
REV. 379 (1973); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Access].
The American rule is in contrast to the practice in England and much of the rest of
the world, where the plaintiff is considered entitled to an award of attorneys' fees as
a portion of his actual loss resulting from the wrongdoer's acts. See generally Committee on Comparative Jurisprudence, Report, ABA INT'L. & CoMP. L. SECTION 125
(1953); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.
301, 311 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum] and sources cited therein. Numerous
commentators have argued in favor of the English and civil law practices. See, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV.
792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development,
38 COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(0 (1970);
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Unfair Competition Act § 801, 15 U.S.C. §
72 (1970); Truth in Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Railway Labor Act § 3.
45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Communications Act of 1934, § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206
(1970); Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
8. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (1970); Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970, § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 204, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970); Civil Rights Act of
1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
9. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161 (1939), said of attorneys' fees: "Allowance of such costs in appropriate
situations is part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 164.
10. When the losing party has engaged in fraudulent, groundless, oppressive, or
vexatious conduct, fees will be awarded under a "bad faith" or "obdurate behavior"

1048

Attorneys' Fees
ception to the rule. Recently a third exception, the "private attorney
12
general" concept, has developed.
The private attorney general exception had its roots in two Supreme Court cases, Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.13 and
'Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 4 which emphasized the inherent
public value of law enforcement through private litigation.' 5 From
doctrine to ensure proper respect for the court system and to protect the honest litigant. See, e.g., F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471
F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973); Undersea Eng'r. & Constr. Co. v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 429 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1970); 6 J. MOORE, FE15ERAL PRAcricTn § 54.77(2)
at 1709 (2d ed. 1948).
11. Should the successful litigant preserve or create a fund or benefit, the fruits of
which extend to an identifiable class, he will often be allowed to recover attorneys'
fees from the fund itself or proportionately from the beneficiaries under the "common
benefit" doctrine. This is an attempt to prevent the unearned or unjust enrichment of
others at the expense of the litigant. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970). The "common benefit" exception developed from earlier "common fund" cases. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1597 (1974). See note 36 infra for an examination of this development.
12. See generally Equal Access, supra note 6; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to
the "Private Attorney General":Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 733 (1973). The phrase "private attorney general" is
attributed to Judge Jerome Frank and was originally used to connote one acting to
enforce existing laws in lieu of the appropriate official. See Associated Indus. v. Ickes,
134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
13. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See note 15 infra.
14. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See note 15 infra.
15. In a suit to enjoin racial discrimination in the operation of several restaurants
in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970),
the Court in Newman articulated the private attorney general concept as follows:

When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages.
If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.
390 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted). Title II provides that a "court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. §

2000a-3(b) (1970). The Newman Court rejected the lower court conclusion that
discretionary fee shifting under the statute was proper only in instances of bad faith.
On the contrary, the purpose of the counsel fee provision was to encourage "private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law" thus vindicating
important public policies. 390 U.S. at 401.
The Court in Mills, a successful derivative action by shareholders to dissolve a
corporate merger accomplished through the use of a misleading proxy statement,
further emphasized the intrinsic public value of private actions effectuating a strong
public policy:
[P] rivate stockholders' actions of this sort "involve corporate therapeutics" and
furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff
who has succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expense but to impose them on the class that has benefited
from them and that would have had to pay for them had it brought the suit.
396 U.S. at 396-97 (footnotes omitted). This was the basis for the expansion from
the "common fund" doctrine to the "common benefit" exception. See note 36 infra.
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such a philosophical foundation lower courts developed a rationale
permitting awards of attorneys' fees to successful parties who pressed
16
claims in the public interest to vindicate important public policies.
B.

The Emergence of Public Interest Law

The development of the private attorney general exception has coincided with the dramatic growth of what is commonly termed "public
interest" law.' 7 The complexity of society, 18 coupled with congressional reliance on the private plaintiff to enforce numerous statutory
rights,' 9 has resulted in the need for qualified legal representation to
16. The major step in the evolution of the private attorney general theory occurred
in Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971), (racial discrimination in housing). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on Mills to uphold fee awards in public interest litigation based on statutes lacking any express fee
shifting authorization. The court determined that Mills "demonstrates that it is proper
for federal courts to award attorney's fees when this remedy effectuates congressional
policy." Id. at 144. After Lee lower federal courts awarded attorneys' fees without
statutory authorization in such areas as prisoners' rights (Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (lst
Cir. 1974); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Newman v. Alabama,
349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972)); search of individuals not suspected of a crime
(Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973)); conditions in state
hospitals for the mentally retarded (Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd in part sub norn. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974));
environmental protection (La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975)); reapportionment (Sims v. Amos.
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.). aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974)); discrimination against nonresidents seeking welfare
(Branoenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974)); union member's rights,
(Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); racial discrimination in public employment (Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir.
1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 374 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); NAACP v. Allen.
340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (alternative holding), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1974)); and racial discrimination in public housing (Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d
852 (Ist Cir. 1972)). Cf. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972) (school
desegregation).
17. Although stating a concise definition of public interest law is difficult and may
be misleading, characteristics often cited as determinative are as follows: the issue
involved is considered to be of great importance, the resolution of the issue affects a
substantial number or class of people, and the litigation has been undertaken by a
member of the private sector. See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 304-05; Hearings on
the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm.
on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. III, at 798 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings] (statement of J. Anthony Kline, attorney, Public Advocates, Inc.).
18. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open . . . to petition for
redress of grievances." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
19. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
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assist in the recognition of rights which might otherwise go unprotected. 20 In view of the fiscally unrewarding nature of much of public
interest litigation,2 1 public interest law firms have been created in an
effort to alleviate the lack of available and affordable counsel for the
22
private party wishing to litigate public policy issues.
I.

THE COURT'S REASONING IN ALYESKA

In concluding that an award of attorneys' fees under the private
attorney general rationale was beyond the scope of a federal court's
equity power, the Court23 noted the practical problems inherent in
deciding what constitutes a public policy of sufficient import to warrafit fee shifting. 24 Furthermore, the Court recognized that the im25
munity of the federal government from liability for attorneys' fees
26
would render the concept applicable only against private parties.
Most important to the Court, however, was the fact that Congress

has recognized attorneys' fees awards as a subject generally within its
authority. 27 Relying heavily on a statutory argument, the Court
20. Senator Tunney, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Representation of
Citizen Interests, notes:
Congress has enacted needed legislation affording citizens important rights in
many areas. All too often, however, not enough attention has been given to the
problem of enforcing these rights. Without effective enforcement, rights are but'
a hollow declaration lacking any substantive effect.
1973 Hearings,supra note 17, at 787.
21. This is due to the complexity and novelty of many public interest issues, requiring immense commitments of time and expertise, and to the fact that much public interest litigation is undertaken to obtain injunctive rather than monetary relief,
for clients lacking substantial monetary resources. Thus, a lawyer approached to do
public interest work is often being asked to devote a tremendous amount of time
with little expectation of reasonable compensation. See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at
303; 121 CONG. REC. 14,975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
22. See generally. Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo.
LJ. 1095 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Halpern & Cunningham]; Comment, The New
PublicInterest Lawyers, 79 YALE L2. 1069 (1970).
23. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. 421 U.S. at 241. Justices
Brennan, id. at 271, and Marshall, id. at 272, each filed a dissenting opinion. Justices
Douglas and Powell did not participate. Id. at 271.
24. Id. at 264.
25. See note 4 supra.
26. 421 U.S. at 267. This result would largely negate the theory's usefulness as a
tool for promoting responsible federal government. Id. The Court also noted a split
of lower court authority over the immunity of state governments under the eleventh
amendment. Id. at 269 n.44. See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1875 (1975).
27. 421 U.S. at 251-57.
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looked to the Fee Bill of 185328 and its successor 29 in conjunction
with the many express provisions for fee awards included in specific
statutes. 30 The Court concluded that congressional silence as to fee
awards may not be ignored by federal courts, but rather must be
3
deemed a restriction of the equity powers of the federal judiciary. '
Otherwise, courts would infringe upon a "policy matter that Congress
32
has reserved for itself."
III.

A CRITIQUE OF THE ALYESKA

A.

The Legal Inconsistencies

OPINION

The Court's opinion is a harsh constriction of the scope of the federal equity power to award attorneys' fees. The Court recognized the
role of this power in the judicial creation of the bad faith and
common benefit exceptions to the American rule, 33 yet abruptly divorced application of the power from the instant situation. 34 Grounds
35
for this distinction were not offered.
The inference of congressional proscription of fee shifting by silence is contrary to recent Supreme Court decisions expanding the
common benefit exception. 36 Although the Court has construed pro28. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161. 421 U.S. at 251-53. The Court
interpreted the statute to confine fee awards to small stipulated amounts, absent other
statutory authorization.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970).
30. 421 U.S. at 260 n.33. See notes 7-8 supra.
31. 421 U.S. at 263-64.
32. Id. at 269.
33. Id.at257-60.
34. Id. at 259. The Court stated: "These exceptions are unquestionably assertions
of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless
forbidden by Congress, but none of the exceptions is involved here." Id. Justice
Marshall noted in his dissent: "While the Court today acknowledges the continued
vitality of these exceptions, it turns its back on the theory underlying them.
Id. at 275.
35. The Court merely asserted that Congress has neither repudiated the existent
exceptions to the general rule nor rejected the rule itself by substantially altering the
Fee Bill of 1853 or its successors. Id. at 260. Yet this equivocation by Congress fails
to explain the impropriety of judicial recognition of a new equitable exception; the
Court has approved the existent exceptions while cognizant of the power of Congress
to proscribe fee awards. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967). Although earlier
Courts had enunciated standards of "over-riding considerations," Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970), and "when the interests of justice so require," Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), as guidelines for application of the federal equity power, the Alyeska Court simply declared all power to be in Congress.
36. The common fund exception was originally applied when litigation resulted in
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scription where appropriate remedies were "meticulously detailed"
without mention of fee shifting,3 7 mere silence has not previously been
38
dispositive of a fee shifting question.
Finally, the Court's basic premise, that the Fee Bill of 185339 mandates application of the American rule, is refutable. As Justice Marshall points out in the principal dissent, 40 the Court had earlier declared the Fee Bill's modern counterpart 4 ' to be an exception to the
rule, rather than its statutory base.42 Language in early common benefit decisions demonstrates the narrow construction previously ac44
corded the statute. 43 The inconsistency of the Court's logic is most
pecuniary benefit befalling a defined class and the court had jurisdiction over a fund
from which the class members could be proportionately taxed to pay an award of
fees. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l.
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Recently the Court, acting pursuant to the federal equity
power, recognized that a nonmonetary "substantial benefit" could be grounds for an
award of fees. Following a derivative suit brought by a shareholder to enforce § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), the Court determined that
the stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed corporate
suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970). Similarly, in Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1 (1973), an action by a union member under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970), for his alleged
unlawful expulsion from the union, the Court found a common benefit in vindication
of a union member's right to free speech.
37. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier. Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967)
(trademark case involving deliberate infringement brought under the Lanham TradeMark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970)).
38. In Mills the Court stated: "The absence of express statutory authorization
for an award of attorneys' fees . . . does not preclude such ...." 396 U.S. at 390.
In Hall the Court reiterated that "we cannot fairly infer from the language of that
provision an intent to deny to the courts the traditional equitable power to grant
counsel fees in 'appropriate' situations." 412 U.S. at 10. See 421 U.S. at 281-82
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80,
10 Stat. 161). Neither petitioners nor respondents mentioned the Fee Bill in their
briefs before the Court.
40. 421 U.S. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan filed a brief dissenting opinion in which he agreed with Justice Marshall that a private attorney general exception could properly be based on the federal equity power and supported
the lower court's exercise of that power. 421 U.S. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970).
42. 421 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), discussed exceptions to the American rule:
28 U.S.C. § 1923(a), which is derived from the Fee Bill of 1853, 10 Stat. 161,
might be termed a general exception. It provides for recovery of nominal sums
known as "Attorney's and proctor's docket fees" .....

to be taxed as part of the

costs defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
386 U.S. at 718 n.11.
43. The Court in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), stated: "[T] he
[fee bill] act contains nothing which can be fairly construed to deprive the Court of
Chancery of its long-established control over the costs and charges of the litigation,
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obvious, however, in light of the creation and continued existence of
the bad faith and common benefit exceptions to the American rule.45
B.

The Effect of Alyeska on Public Interest Law

To date, the greatest problem confronting the development of
public interest law has been funding. 46 Forced to deemphasize reliance upon private foundation grants, 47 the primary funding source of
the past, 48 public interest law firms had begun before Alyeska to look
to court-awarded attorneys' fees as a means of achieving self-sufficiency. 49 Although the congressional authorization for fee awards
made necessary by Alyeska exists in a number of areas,5 0 with a few
notable exceptions 51 Congress "has not acted in areas of the law that
to be exercised as equity and justice may require ....
" Id. at 536. Further, in
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), the Court asserted: "The provisions of the fee bill of 1853 that certain specified fees and no others shall be taxed
to attorneys in the courts of the United States applies only to 'party and party' costs."
Id. at 165 n.2. As to costs "as between solicitor and client," the English practice was
followed by the Supreme Court and it was held that the allowance of such costs was
within the authority of the federal courts. Id.
44. The cases cited to support the Court's statutory construction, see note 28
supra, may be distinguished as pertaining solely to sums permitted as ordinary taxable costs and hence not touching upon the federal equity power to award attorneys'
fees. See 421 U.S. at 279-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527, 530 (1962), distinguishing The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377 (1869);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-67 & n.2 (1939); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533, 535-36 (1881).
45. Justice Marshall states that "[t] he Court's recognition of the several judgemade exceptions to the American rule demonstrates the inadequacy of its analysis."
421 U.S. at 282.
46. See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 310. Halpern & Cunningham assert that "the
ingenuity of public interest lawyers promises to be as powerfully tested by problems
of funding as by those of litigation." Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 22, at 1112.
47. For example, as early as 1973 the Ford Foundation asked five prominent environmental law firms to investigate other funding sources. 1973 Hearings, supra note
17, at 1252-53 (excerpt from Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1973). A Ford Foundation
pamphlet, The Public Interest Law Firms, New Voices for New Constituencies, states
that foundation grants are provided as seed money and that recipients are expected
to become self-sufficient. 1973 Hearings, supra note 17, at 849-50 (statement of
Joseph Onek, Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy).
48. Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 22, at 1112.
49. Charles Halpern, of the Council for Public Interest Law. has stated: "Until
Alyeska, I would have probably said that attorneys' fee awards were the number one
factor in the future of public interest law financing." Witt, After Alyeska: Can the
Contender Survive?, JURIS DOCTOR, Oct. 1975, at 35.
50. See statutes cited in notes 7-8 supra.
51. For example, Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorize fee
shifting. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970). Mr. Eric Schnapper, of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, has stated: "Alyeska's impact on civil rights litigation
has been limited because many types of civil rights cases involve statutes authorizing
counsel fees. The main exceptions are prison cases and employment discrimination
cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Letter from Eric Schnapper to the author, De-
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are of particular concern to public interest lawyers." 52 The Alyeska
decision therefore strikes a serious blow to the financial viability of
public interest law53 and the ability of the individual to enforce statu54
tory rights declared in the common interest.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN RULE
EXCEPTIONS

A.

The Bad Faith and Common Benefit Exceptions

After Alyeska, it is important to consider the extent to which the
bad faith and common benefit exceptions to the American rule may be
used in the federal courts, for although Congress has considered legis55
lation designed to reintroduce the private attorney general theory it
cember 8, 1975, on file with the Washington Law Review. See also the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, § 12(a), 42 U.5.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
52. 1973 Hearings,supra note 17, at 790 (statement of.J. Anthony Kline).
53. Brent N. Rushforth of the Center for Law in the Public Interest has stated:
In our opinion the decision will have a very significant detrimental effect on
the financial viability of public interest law firms such as ours. The private attorney
general doctrine as it had developed in federal court was one of the most important underpinnings of our financial future. We had, for example, motions pending in federal and California state courts under the private attorney general doctrine which may have resulted in attorney's fee awards to the Center of between $5"00,000 and $ "million.
Letter from Brent N. Rushforth to the author, January 7, 1976, on file with the
Washington Law Review. Mark C. Morril of the Legal Action Center agrees that the
effect of Alyeska will be quite detrimental:
It is our general view that the Alyeska ruling constituted a severe blow to
public interest law firms such as ours, since the private attorney general theory
had previously appeared to provide the possibility of substantially supplementing,
other means of support through the award of counsel fees and costs in major
litigation efforts.
Letter from Mark C. Morril to the author, January 22, 1976, on file with the Washington Law Review.
54. One commentator has noted that " [ w] ithout court-awarded fees for the private citizen litigating in the public interest, the call for individual citizen participation becomes hollow." Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1222, 1227-28 (1973).
55. Congressional activity to date includes both general and specific measures to
facilitate fee shifting. Bills introduced by Congressman Seiberling (R. Ohio), H.R.
7826 & 8221, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), would reaffirm the federal equity power
by allowing fee shifting at the discretion of the court when "the interests of justice so
require." Under these proposals the United States would lose its alleged immunity
from fee shifting and face liability equal to that of the private defendant. A number
of other proposals would go so far as to permit an award of fees to a prevailing
defendant if the United States were the plaintiff. H.R. 8378; 8821; 9093; 10,347;
10,992; 11,054, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Proposals of Congressman Drinan (D.
Mass.) would also permit fee shifting against the federal government in successful
consumer, environmental, and civil rights actions challenging an agency decision.
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is uncertain whether any such measure will be adopted. Thus, for the
present, any expansion of judicial fee shifting can occur only through
56
an extension of the two traditional exceptions.
The bad faith concept holds the most promise as an alternative to
the private attorney general theory. In a number of cases prior to
Alyeska, the private attorney general rationale was utilized in situations where the bad faith exception would have been equally applicable. 57 Following Alyeska at least one court has employed a bad
faith rationale in affirming a fee award originally granted under the
private attorney general concept. 58 Thus, the exception as it presently
exists may serve as an alternative basis for fee shifting in limited situations in litigation undertaken in the public interest.
An expansion of the bad faith exception is also possible, and has
been suggested by post-Alyeska commentators to encompass situations of flagrant disregard for a statute59 or established environmental
standards. 60 Although the liberal standards of discretion inherent in
the exception make such expansion possible, such criteria would involve questions of the guilty party's intent and hence an increased
burden of proof for the plaintiff. A more dramatic possibility of expansion of the bad faith rationale has been inferred by a pre-Alyeska

H.R. 7968, 8743, 11,010, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Other proposals would allow
or compel fee shifting to prevailing plaintiffs in suits under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 (H.R. 7825 & 8218, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975)). the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (H.R. 7829 & 8222, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1975)). and sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (H.R. 7828, 8220, 9552, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1975)).
In the Senate. Senator Tunney has introduced a bill to allow discretionary fee shifting under non-authorized sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. S. 2278, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
56. See Note. 89 HARV. L. REV. 170. 181-82 (1975); Note. 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV.
777, 794; Note, 6 ENV. L. 243, 252-53 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974)
(racial discrimination in public education); Fairley v. Patterson. 493 F.2d 598 (5th
Cir. 1974) (reapportionment); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.. 444 F.2d 143 (5th
Cir. 1971) (racial discrimination in housing); Wyatt v. Stickney. 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (conditions in state hospitals for the mentally retarded); NAACP v. Allen. 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (alternative holding), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974) (racial discrimination in public employment).
58. Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975). This case was a civil rights
class action involving the right to an abortion at public hospitals wherein the court
found that defendants had "obstinately continued to implement and enforce statutes.
regulations and policies designed to circumvent the constitutional law declared by the
Supreme Court." Id. at 547.
59. Note, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 777, 794.
60. Note, 6 ENV. L. 243, 253 (1975).
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commentator"' from a school desegregation case6 2 in which the court,
without challenging the defendant's good faith, awarded fees in view
of the length of time the case had been before the courts and the necessity of judicial encouragement to achieve progress. 63 On appeal the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit asserted that such an award
of attorneys' fees was "within [the court's] discretion and will not be
disturbed absent a record showing evidential abuse." 6 4 In view of the
Alyeska Court's restriction of the federal equity power, however, such
wide discretion may no longer be available.
The common benefit exception does not hold the potential of the
bad faith exception as an alternative to the private attorney general

theory. Its application is constrained by the requirement that a substantial benefit accrue to members of a defined class. 65 Although a
plaintiff might assert that the public or a segment thereof is the benefi-

ciary class of a vindication of public policy, 66 such would be contrary
to the view of the Alyeska majority which concluded that the common
benefit exception "ill suits litigation in which the purported benefits
accrue to the general public."6 7 In view of its limited scope and the
attitude of the Supreme Court, it is doubtful that the common benefit
exception can be a viable alternative to the private attorney general

rationale.

61. See Equal Access, supra note 6, at 661, wherein it is concluded: "The new
elements for an award based on 'bad faith'.., seem to be a clearly defined and established right, and the need for judicial assistance in securing that right." Id.
62. Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.
1968).
63. The court in Catojustified an award of fees as follows:
This litigation has been going on for nine years. While the Court does not impugn the Board's good faith in trying to carry out the mandate of the Brown
decisions, ... it cannot be gainsaid that whatever progress has been made in the
direction of desegregation ... has followed judicial prodding.
293 F. Supp. at 1378.
64. Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12, 16 (8th Cir. 1968).
65. See note 36 supra.
66. See Note, 6 ENv. L. 243, 252-53 (1975). The author asserts that there is
"virtually always a 'common benefit' realized" from environmental litigation, necessitating only the identification of a definite beneficiary class and the locating of a chargeable fund "or some other mechanism for assessing costs against the beneficiaries of the
litigation." Id.
67. 421 U.S. at 265 n.39. The Court noted that in prior common benefit situations
"the classes of beneficiaries were small in number and easily identifiable. The benefits
could be traced with some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the
costs could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting." Id.
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The PrivateAttorney General Exception

In spite of the rejection of the private attorney general exception in
the federal system, its adoption by the individual states is still possi-

ble.68 The question of a standard for the proper implementation of the
exception is, therefore, far from moot.
Justice Marshall, in his Alyeska dissent, asserted that the private

attorney general theory was a feasible exception and offered the fol69
lowing guidelines for its application:

The reasonable cost of the plaintiffs representation should be placed
upon the defendant if (1) the important right being protected is one
actually or necessarily shared by the general public or some class
thereof; (2) the plaintiffs pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any,
would not normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3)
shifting that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class
that benefits from the litigation.

These guidelines touch a number of issues. The first is whether the
private attorney general rule should be available to both plaintiffs and
defendants. Generally it is felt that only a plaintiff should be eligible, 70 although the A lyeska Court questioned whether a "prevailing
party" standard might be desirable. 71 A more interesting question is
whether a plaintiff must be successful or simply accomplish a worthy
purpose such as furthering public policy or educating the court.72 In
the interest of a more definite standard and in order to discourage
frivolous litigation 73 it is suggested that only a successful plaintiff be
68. See part IV--C infra. It should be noted that employment of the private attorney general concept may continue in federal courts in certain diversity actions. In
diversity cases the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires
that state law govern the grant or denial of fee awards. See 421 U.S. at 259 n.31;
Culbertson v. JNO. McCall Coal Co., 495 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1033 (1974).
69. 421 U.S. at 284-85.
70. See Equal Access, supra note 6, at 675-76; Note. 89 HARV. L. REV. 170. 180
(1975); Note, 55 NEB. L. REV. 283, 297 (1976).
71. 421 U.S. at 264. The Court noted that certain statutory authorizations of fee
awards mention only prevailing parties. Id. at 264 n.37. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285
(patent infringement); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e5(k). See also Note, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 777, 791-92. The concept of awarding fees
to a defendant, however, while perhaps desirable in an imaginable context, would not
further the purpose of enforcement basic to the private attorney general theory. See
Equal Access, supra note 6, at 675-76.
72. Equal Access, supra note 6, at 675. See also Comment, After Alyeska: Will
Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 298 (1976).
73. Note the following indication of congressional intent concerning the "prevail-
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allowed to recover attorneys' fees under the private attorney general

rationale.
Clearly the most subjective issue and that most bothersome to the
Alyeska majority is the definition of the importance or "strength" of
public policy. 74 Justice Marshall said little on this issue,7 5 speaking
only of an "important right."7 6 Other commentators have been

equally liberal, encouraging broad judicial discretion within such standards as "a substantial public interest" 77 or "actual societal benefits." ' s
Such reliance on the discretion of the judiciary, however, was what
the Alyeska majority could not accept.1 9

A narrower standard would allow fee shifting for vindicating a
strong legislative policy "whenever there is nothing in a statutory
scheme which might be interpreted as precluding [a fee award] .,80
Although lower courts have applied this "strong congressional policy"
standard, 8 1 the Alyeska Court criticized the judicial discretion allowed
ing party" standard by which fee awards are adjudged under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970): "That language was inserted in the bill to
deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation." 110 CONG. REc. 13668 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Lausche).
74. In dictum the Court asserted that "it would be difficult, indeed, for the
courts, without legislative guidance, to consider some statutes important and others
unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the former." 421
U.S. at 263-64. The court of appeals in Alyeska had divided 4-3, not over the propriety of the use of the federal equity power, but over whether the public interest had
in fact been served by the efforts of the litigants. The dissent centered its arguments
on the relative obscurity of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, while the majority considered the overall effect of the plaintiffs' efforts. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495
F.2d 1026, 1034-36, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. Justice Marshall did assert that "[t] here is hardly room for doubt that the
first of these criteria is met in the present case. Significant public benefits are derived
from citizen litigation to vindicate expressions of congressional or constitutional
policy" 421 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
76. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
77.

Note, 55 NEB. L. REV. 283,297 (1976).

78. Note, 24 HASTINGs LJ. 733, 758 (1973). See also Note, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV.
777. The most liberal standard suggested is that "attorney fees should be granted any
party who seeks to represent a relevant policy position which is not normally represented before the court." Equal Access, supra note 6, at 675. See also Comment, supra
note 72, at 298.
79. 421 U.S. at 263-64. Justice Marshall noted:
[T] he Court suggests that the policy questions bearing on whether to grant attorneys' fees in a particular case are not ones that the judiciary is well equipped to
handle, and that fee shifting under the private attorney general rationale would
quickly degenerate into an arbitrary and lawless process.
Id. at 273.
80. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
81. See, e.g., Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Cornist v.
Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v.
Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). The Washington supreme
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under this standard in view of the possibility of an award of fees to a
plaintiff bringing action under any federal statute.8 2 The congressional policy standard is, however, too restrictive. Under this standard
actions vindicating constitutional rights8 3 or diversity actions brought

under state law8 4 would be ineligible for equitable fee shifting.
An alternative standard is one which would permit an award of fees
85
to a plaintiff who successfully vindicated a constitutionalright. It is
argued 8 6 that such a standard would eliminate the subjective reasoning necessary to weigh the importance of a public policy that so
bothered the Alyeska Court.8 7 While granting fee awards for the protection of constitutional rights may be desirable, constricting the fee
shifting power under the exception as suggested would exclude both
purely statutory rights and some constitutional rights deliberately protected by statute. 88 Such an emasculation of the scope of the private
attorney general theory is not desirable.
A court should choose either the limited "important legislative policy" concept or the expansive "important public policy" rationale.
Courts employing the former have demonstrated that the relative
importance of policy issues often may be determined by the traditional examinations of legislative history, statutory language, and judicial precedent. 89 In the interest of the most comprehensive protection
court has defined the private attorney general concept as involving the vindication of
"an important legislative policy." Public Util. Dist. No. I v. Kottsick. 86 Wn. 2d 388.
391, 545 P.2d 1, 4 (1976).
82. 421 U.S. at 263-64. A problem could occur if nuisance suits were brought
over inconsequential violations of federal statutes. Note, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 733, 75657(1973).
83. E.g., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (actions to redress civil rights deprivations under color of state law). See 421 U.S. at 264.
84. See Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 756 n.94 (1973). This argument is inapplicable to application of a private attorney general concept by a state court, of course.
85. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 180 (1975).
86. Id.
87. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Tile Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 170, 180-81 n.72
(1975). Thus actions under such major legislation as the Civil Rights Acts of 1957.
1960, 1964, and 1968 (including the fair housing provision) and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 would not qualify for fee awards because the statutory cause of action
does not exist under the Constitution alone.
89. For example, the court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1972), a case concerned with environmental protection and housing assistance, quoted
from Supreme Court opinions, congressional declarations, and applicable statutory
language before concluding that "[flew public policies are accorded the weight
and priority of those present in this lawsuit." Id. at 99. A different approach was taken
in Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971), which dealt
with racial discrimination in housing. The court there compared the policy declarations of the Fair Housing Law. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). which provides for at-
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of both legislative and constitutional rights and encouragement of
equal access to the courts, however, the "important public policy"
standard should be adopted. 9 0
Closely related to the idea of a protected right is the size of the
beneficiary class required under the private attorney general rule. Justice Marshall noted that the right being protected should be common
to "the general public or some class thereof."91 The size of the class
should not be a material consideration in the application of the private
attorney general rule, 92 although some courts have suggested otherwise.93 Requiring the litigation to benefit a large number of people may
render worthy actions whose direct benefits accrue to a limited
number of individuals, such as prisoners or mental patients, ineligible
for the application of the rule.
Justice Marshall's next guideline for application of the private attorney general rule was that the financial burden of the litigation be
greater than the pecuniary interest of the plaintiff. 94 This requirement
distinguishes the typical public interest suit, in which there is little

chance that the plaintiff could pay his attorneys' fees from his damage
award, from a suit in which the damages awarded would be adequate

for paying attorneys' fees.
A related issue, not considered by Justice Marshall, is the need for
torney fee awards, with those of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (under which suit was
brought), and concluded that fee shifting was appropriate because under § 1982 the
policy considerations behind the two statutes were equivalent. 444 F.2d at 147-48.
90. Whatever standard is adopted, courts should realize that in order to justify fee
shifting under the private attorney general rule, the result of the suit must be a net
benefit. That is, the societal benefits of the litigation must be greater than the societal
detriments, including cost of litigation. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv.
L. REv.170, 179 (1975).
91. 421 U.S. at 285, quoted in text accompanying note 69 supra.
92. See Equal Access, supra note 6, at 672-73.
93. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The Washington supreme court, in dictum, demanded plaintiffs' action benefit "a large class of
people" in concluding that plaintiffs were ineligible for a fee award in Public Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Kottsick, 86 Wn. 2d 388, 392, 545 P.2d 1, 4 (1976). The court could
have reached the same result by comparing the personal interest of the plaintiffs
with the financial burden of litigation, as it appears the action was brought for private
reasons and not in the public interest. Id.
94. 421 U.S. at 285. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Equal Access, supra note 6, at 671-72; Note, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 777, 792;
Note, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 733, 760-61 (1973). Justice Marshall summarized the Alyeska
situation as follows:
The disparity between respondents' direct stake in the outcome and the resources
required to pursue the case is exceeded only by the disparity between their resources and those of their opponents--the Federal Government and a consortium of giant oil companies.
421 U.S. at 287.
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private enforcement of the right in question. Where the government
itself has refused to enforce a right, the need is clear because it is the
government's responsibility to enforce the type of rights involved in
private attorney general situations. 95 In an action against a private
party, however, the need for private enforcement must be clearly
shown, for it would be inequitable to charge an award of fees against
a losing private defendant simply because the plaintiff was a private
individual rather than a public official. 96 In such a situation an appraisal of legislative reliance on private enforcement 97 and of the willingness of the executive branch to compel statutory compliance 98
would be necessary.
Justice Marshall's final suggestion would allow fee shifting only
where the defendant may redistribute his loss among beneficiaries of
the litigation. The rationale behind this concept is not that of the private attorney general theory, 99 but rather that of the common benefit
exception which seeks to avoid the unjust enrichment of members of
the beneficiary class. 100 Such an extension of common benefit reasoning into the private attorney general field would have two undesirable effects. First, it would broaden the common benefit exception
requirement that a fee award be assessed against the members of a
well-defined class. 1 0 ' Second, it would severely restrict the private attorney general theory, for a defendant against whom the concept
95. The need to "guard the guardians" was illustrated in La Raza where the
court noted that "[t]he only public entities that might have brought suit in this
case were named as defendants in this action and vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contentions." 57 F.R.D. at 101.
96. See Comment, The Discretionary A ward of Attorney's Fees by the Federal
Courts: Selective Deviation from the No-Fee Rule and the Regrettably Brief Life of
the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 36 OHIO ST. LJ. 588, 631 (1975); Equal
Access, supra note 6, at 671.
97. See note 19 and accompanying test supra.
98. Justice Marshall asserted that in Alyeska "IT]he record demonstrates that
... the Government [was] unwilling to enforce congressional land use policy." 421
U.S. at 286.
99. 421 U.S. at 264 n.39. As has been seen, the rationale behind the private attorney general concept is to permit fee shifting as a reward for advancing national
policy in the public interest, without regard to redistribution of costs among the
public. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
100. See note 11 supra.
101. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and Hall v. Cole.
412 U.S. 1 (1973), the fee awards could be assessed to the corporation and to the
union respectively as each represented the interests of a well-defined class. See note 36
supra. Justice Marshall contended in Alyeska that the private defendants were in a
similar position to distribute the litigation costs to the oil-consuming general public.
421 U.S. at 287-88. The general public, however, is not a well-defined class comparable to a corporation's shareholders or a union's members.
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would have otherwise applied may be unable to distribute the burden
02
of the fee award to the beneficiaries of the decision.'
An award of attorneys' fees under a private attorney general exception, then, should be proper when (1) a successful plaintiff (2) protects
an important public policy or right (3) in litigation where the financial
burden of necessary private action is greater than the pecuniary interest of the plaintiff in the outcome.
C.

The PrivateAttorney General Theory in Washington and Other
State Courts

Although Washington recognizes the American rule,' 03 it is quite
possible that the private attorney general concept may be adopted in
this state. The Washington judiciary has recognized the federally approved equitable exceptions of bad faith, 04 common fund,105 and
substantial benefit. 10 6 Not all states have been so willing to adopt the
federal exceptions. 107 Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court
has extended one of these exceptions further than have federal courts.
In Weiss v. Bruno'0 8 the Washington Supreme Court approved an
award of fees to plaintiffs who were successful in upholding a consti-

tutional principle' 0 9 under the following "narrow and very limited cir-

102. Although this common benefit reasoning would have been applicable in
Alyeska because the defendant oil company was engaged in national marketing of a
commodity necessary to the general public, prisoners' rights and racial descrimination
cases are examples of instances in which it would be impossible to force all beneficiaries of the litigation to share the burden of the fee award.
103. See State ex rel. Macri v. Bremerton, 8 Wn. 2d 93, 111 P.2d 612 (1941).
104. Id. at 113, Ill P.2d at 621 (bad faith exception inapplicable in an action
concerning withheld payments on a public works contract).
105. See Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Jarvis, 58 Wn. 2d 627, 364 P.2d 436 (1961)(action
for a declaratory judgment authorizing a trustee to pay medical expenses incurred by
the primary beneficiary).
106. See Grein v. Cavano, 61 Wn. 2d 498, 379 P.2d 209 (1963)(a labor dispute
in which no monetary benefit was realized). This decision preceded Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1 (1973), by ten years. See note 36 supra.
107. For example, California has not accepted the bad faith exception. See Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d 449, 470, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683,
695 (1975).
108. 83 Wn. 2d 911, 523 P.2d 915 (1974). The court had held that certain state
fund distribution statutes violated the first amendment separation of church and state
doctrine a year earlier in Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wn. 2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973).
109. In a later decision the Washington supreme court commented on the rationale of Weiss:
This decision focused on the power of the judiciary, as the primary interpreter
and enforcer of the constitution, to award attorney fees to individuals who successfully defend particular constitutional principles.
Public Util. Dist. No. I v. Kottsick, 86 Wn. 2d 388, 391, 545 P.2d 1, 4 (1976).
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cumstances:" "(1) a successful suit brought by [plaintiffs] (2) challenging the expenditure of public funds (3) made pursuant to patently
unconstitutional legislative and administrative actions (4) following a
refusal by the appropriate official and agency to maintain such a challenge." 11 0 The court considered this holding an extension of the
" '
common fund exception. 11
In addition to Washington's liberal stance towards equitable exceptions to the American rule, the court has recently evidenced a willingness to consider application of the private attorney general concept in
a proper situation.1 12 Thus, it would not be surprising if Washington
accepted the private attorney general exception in the near future.
Outside of Washington, other state courts have neither accepted
nor rejected the private attorney general concept since Alyeska." 3 In
California, the state supreme court declined to consider the applicability of the exception prior to Alyeska." 4 In view of that court's reluctance, post-Alyeska California appellate courts have also declined

110. 83 Wn. 2d at 914, 523 P.2d at 917.
111.
Id. at 913-14, 523 P.2d at 916-17. The court stated: "We find the underlying
philosophy of the common fund doctrine, and particularly that portion dealing with
the preservation of a fund, to be appropriate for the facts before us." Id. at 913. 523
P.2d at 916.
112. The court in Kottsick (in dictum) defined the proper situation for application
of the private attorney general rule as: "whenever the successful litigant (1) incurs
considerable economic expense, (2) to effectuate an important legislative policy.
which benefits a large class of people." 86 Wn. 2d at 392, 545 P.2d at 4. The court
further added that "[w] e express no opinion on the adoption of this exception as
the law of this jurisdiction." Kottsick involved a successful challenge of condemnation proceedings on the grounds of a failure to comply with the State Environmental
Policy Act.
113. A few states, however, including Washington, allow limited fee shifting by
statute. The most liberal of such exceptions to the American rule is Alaska's Civil
Rule 82, which permits fee awards as an element of costs to the prevailing party unless the court directs otherwise. ALAS. R. Civ. P, 82(a). See Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. REv. 129
(1974). Nevada provides for fee awards to successful plaintiffs or counterclaimants
who have recovered not more than $10,000 and to successful defendants when the
plaintiff did not ask recovery in excess of $10.000. NEv. REv. STAT. § 18.010(3)
(1975). Washington allows fee shifting under certain circumstances to the prevailing
party in litigation where the amount pleaded is less than $1,000. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.84.250 (Supp. 1975). Similar statutes are found in Alaska and North Carolina.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.015 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (1973).

114. See Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n. 13 Cal. 3d 483, 485, 531
P.2d 783, 784, 119 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1975) (suit to compel submission of environmental impact statement); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners. II Cal. 3d 1. 27.
520 P.2d 10, 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974) (denial of equal protection to graduates
of osteopathic colleges).
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to face the question.1 1 5 In New York the situation is similar. In a recent case"1 6 the Civil Court of the City of New York refused to pass
on "the issue of whether attorneys fees could be awarded on the
theory that [the plaintiff] acted as a private attorney general because
such fees are not sought and that area of the law is still in a great state
I 17

of flUX.""

V.

CONCLUSION

Concern with the outcome of Alyeska goes beyond the Court's
noncompelling reasoning demanding statutory authorization of fee
shifting, for the decision deals a crushing blow to the financial viability of public interest law. Although state courts may act to partially
alleviate the problem, the United States Supreme Court should reconsider the need for and bases of the federal equity power, lest the ideal
of equal access to the courts be not merely tarnished, but discarded." 8

Stephen M. Todd
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